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Introduction
Governed, designed and funded by the three central  
agencies,1 but delivered by the State Services Commission,  
the Performance Improvement Framework (PIF) is now three 
years old. Twenty-one reviews have been published.2 Four are 
currently under way, including the first PIF re-review. Three 
agencies have completed follow-up reviews. In addition, 
over 250 state servants have attended a PIF self-review 
workshop. Also, several new 
products and services are in 
development, including a PIF 
cluster model. Finally, the PIF 
agency model is in the middle 
of a two-stage upgrade, that 
reflects the ambition and new 
performance expectations 
at the heart of the advice of 
the Better Public Services 
Advisory Group (Better 
Public Services Advisory 
Group, 2011).
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So, what do we know after three years? 
At a meta-level, what do the PIF findings 
challenge us to think about? What should 
we start paying attention to?  This article 
seeks to answer those questions. It is 
not definitive. This article aims to draw 
attention to what may in time prove to 
be a particularly useful data set – a data 
set the whole of which is greater than the 
sum of its parts in that it reveals both 
enduring and emerging trends about 
contemporary public management in 
New Zealand.3 
The article is organised into four 
parts. It moves from the general to the 
specific and then back to the general. Part 
one orientates the reader by introducing 
the PIF to those who are unfamiliar 
with it. It covers what the PIF is, why it 
was introduced, and some of the early 
benefits, as well as the intervention logic 
at the heart of the PIF programme. The 
following section explores the difficulties 
and technical hitches in aggregating the 
PIF agency data. This is followed by an 
attempt to find trends and patterns in the 
metadata and translate them into useful 
information – both to provoke debate 
and reconfirm a few lessons. Finally, the 
article offers an insight into how PIF 
system analysis provides support for 
the areas identified by the Better Public 
Services Advisory Group, and the actions 
being taken to address them. 
What is the Performance Improvement 
Framework? 
The term PIF refers to a review as well as 
to the model or framework. Essentially, 
it is a review of an agency’s fitness for 
purpose today and for the future. Using 
the PIF agency model, a PIF review 
looks at the current state of an agency 
and how well placed it is to deal with the 
issues that confront it in the medium-
term future. The PIF agency model was 
designed by the central agencies and chief 
executives from across the state services. 
Unlike the public service improvement 
models in the United Kingdom and 
Australia, it covers both results and 
organisational management. It has six 
critical areas, supported by 17 elements 
and 28 lead questions. The lead questions 
are supported by 88 lines of enquiry. 
Unlike the rating system in the United 
Kingdom, Australia and South Africa, it 
rewards sustained results, stewardship 
and continuous improvement. 
A PIF review is done in two ways. The 
first is a formal review. Like in Australia, 
but unlike in Canada, the UK and South 
Africa, a formal review is conducted by 
independent experts. Called PIF lead 
reviewers, these experts review an agency’s 
capability, performance and ability to 
deliver on government priorities, its core 
business and a range of organisational 
management elements, using the PIF 
agency model. This review is largely ex 
post. New Zealand is the only jurisdiction 
which then takes an ex ante position by 
asking two critical questions and inviting 
the agency to respond: 
1. What is the contribution New Zealand 
needs from this agency, and, therefore, 
what is its future performance 
challenge? 
2. If the agency is to be successful at 
meeting the future performance 
challenge, what would success look 
like in four years’?
In short, a PIF review assesses what 
an agency does well and what issues it 
needs to work on to be more effective 
in the future.4 An agency develops a 
response addressing any matters raised 
and to indicate what it will do to face the 
challenges of the future (State Services 
Commission, 2012b). That response is 
then implemented by the agency; central 
agencies provide guidance, support and 
oversight on behalf of ministers. 
Many agencies in the wider public 
sector are not eligible for a formal review. 
Those agencies use the PIF agency model 
as a self-review tool to measure and 
improve their own performances. This is 
the second way a PIF review is done. Self-
review workshops are conducted every 
quarter. These workshops are always 
oversubscribed. 
To ensure an agency realises the 
benefit of a formal review, the PIF follow-
up review has been launched. It is a 
recent innovation, designed originally by 
Land Information New Zealand and the 
Department of Conservation. The follow-
up review occurs 12–18 months after a 
formal review. It is conducted by the PIF 
lead reviewers, but is largely led by the 
chief executive and the senior leaders in 
the agency. While it does not have ratings, 
the follow-up review is published. It is 
designed to ensure that each agency has 
an opportunity to take stock, make sure 
that it is realising the benefits of the most 
recent PIF review, and is still well placed 
to deal with the future challenges. Three 
follow-up reviews have been completed. 
These provide ministers and the public 
with assurance that the agencies involved 
are continuously seeking to improve and 
that their journey is transparent. 
Why was PIF introduced?
When Iain Rennie became the State 
Services Commissioner in 2008 he was 
concerned that the public service was not 
perceived as taking ownership of its own 
performance improvement. He noted that 
there were plenty of reports from external 
agencies and lobby groups, and these 
were often critical of the public service. 
Many of them, he felt, did not recognise 
the real strength of the public service, and 
equally he wanted to move the culture 
of the public service towards continuous 
improvement and innovation (State 
Services Commission, 2012a). 
In 2009, Rennie and the then chief 
executive of the Department of the 
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Prime Minister and Cabinet, Maarten 
Wevers, travelled to the UK to meet with 
the British Cabinet secretary, Lord Gus 
O’Donnell. The origins of PIF lie in their 
discussions. On their return Rennie and 
Wevers commissioned a team from across 
the state services to take the best of the UK 
Capability Review Programme and the 
best of the organisational improvement 
models from the New Zealand private 
sector, as well as methodologies from 
other jurisdictions, and adapt them to the 
New Zealand public management system 
(State Services Commission, 2012a).
What are the early benefits?
From the PIF process the central agencies 
get a picture of what is good about the 
New Zealand public management system 
and what needs to improve. Central agency 
officials would frequently be asked, ‘Who 
is good at financial management?’, or 
‘Who is good at setting strategy?’ Up until 
now there has been no way they could 
point to the areas of demonstrable and 
evidential strength. Now they can. Before 
PIF, everyone had their own anecdotes 
about what needed to be done better. For 
central agency officials, PIF gives a system-
wide diagnosis about what is being done 
well and where the system can improve. 
In addition, ministers get assurance that 
the agencies they are responsible for are 
constantly looking to improve how they 
do business and deliver value for the 
taxpayers’ investment in them. Ministers 
also get independent assurance, as the PIF 
formal reviews are undertaken by external 
expert parties. Finally, and probably most 
importantly, the public is able to see that 
the state services are on the move and are 
serious about the services they deliver and 
how these are delivered: the public can see 
that the state services are continuously 
seeking to improve and are transparent 
about that journey. 
What is the intervention logic?
At the heart of the PIF is the intervention 
logic (and design assumption) that an 
ethical and impartial state service is 
fundamental to maintaining trust, but 
integrity and impartiality, while necessary, 
are not sufficient to maintain confidence 
in New Zealand’s public institutions 
(State Services Commission, 2011a). Public 
institutions need to deliver – they need to 
perform – and they need to demonstrate 
to citizens that they take performance 
improvement seriously. The value of PIF 
is that it was designed to support public 
institutions to improve and demonstrate 
a commitment to performance improve-
ment.
PIF system analysis: difficulties and 
technical hitches
So, what role does the PIF play in enabling 
a high-integrity and high-performing 
state sector? After being redesigned over 
the past 12 months, PIF is now a method 
for systematically identifying the extent 
to which an agency understands its role 
and purpose and determining how it 
is led, managed and resourced (State 
Services Commission, 2012d). Three 
years ago it was simply an organisational 
diagnostic tool; now it is a process 
designed specifically for the New Zealand 
state services to ensure chief executives 
and senior leaders have well-developed 
views on the most important issues facing 
New Zealand, what it will take for their 
particular agency or sector to address 
those issues, and the role each agency and 
sector can and should play. 
How does the PIF system analysis now 
under-way in the central agencies add to 
the collective knowledge? How does it 
help ministers, agencies, stakeholders and 
the public understand the functioning 
and performance of the state sector? 
The three purposes for which PIF was 
set up are to: 
• help chief executives drive 
improvements in agency and cross-
agency performance; 
• give ministers, stakeholders, and the 
public assurance about current levels 
of agency and system performance, 
and progress on improving both; and 
• give central agencies a coherent view 
of agency and system performance 
and position central agencies to 
prioritise and drive improvements. 
(State Services Commission, 2011b) 
The PIF system analysis plays a part 
in all three purposes, but primarily, in 
the last one. Some early results of this 
analysis will be discussed below, but 
first some technical limits and pitfalls 
of the analysis need to be recognised. 
First, a PIF agency review is not an audit, 
scientific evaluation, an investigation of 
compliance or an accreditation process. 
Rather, it is an integrated, deep, fast and 
independent review of an agency’s fitness 
for purpose and indicates how well placed 
that agency is to deal with the issues that 
confront it in the near future. Moreover, 
the report is published, as are all on the 
State Services Commission website. The 
method of enquiry is mixed. Quantitative 
and qualitative analyses are used, often in 
combination with desktop analysis and 
one-on-one interviews and focus groups 
which use the methods of appreciative 
enquiry and strengths-based analysis 
(State Services Commission, 2012a) – 
these are focused on internally-driven 
organisational learning. PIF also has the 
advantage of integrating publicly-available 
performance information and internal 
management information from the State 
Services Commission, the Treasury and 
the Department of the Prime Minister 
and Cabinet (State Services Commission, 
2012b). Finally, the reviews themselves rely 
on a peer review, and the ratings are a set 
of judgements about an agreed, though 
unknown, future state. In that respect, the 
PIF process is ‘heuristic’ (Ryan, 2004), one 
through which agencies learn their way 
forward through collective dialogue and 
internal reflection.
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Second, because each PIF agency review 
is contextually relevant to that agency and 
the particular challenges the agency faces, 
the ratings cannot be regarded as easily 
or productively comparable. Simple, 
standardised indicators, therefore, do not 
apply. The State Services Commission 
is emphatic on this point: it is not 
possible to benchmark with PIF in the 
same way that common indicators 
are used in the Better Administrative 
and Support Services (BASS) process 
(State Services Commission, 2012c).5 
The ratings recorded for any aspect of 
agency performance represent a collective 
judgement constructed and moderated in 
the course of the process by a group of 
actors (particularly the lead reviewers, but 
also chief executives and central agency 
officials) who collaborate across several 
reviews using a complex framework of 
shared criteria (performance expectations 
and standards) applied consistently 
across different organisational settings.6 
These judgements are broadly relational 
between agencies but not strictly 
comparable. Ascribing scores to those 
judgements is useful but also problematic. 
Conversion into simple numerics dilutes 
the most important aspect of the PIF 
process: the narrative through time of 
organisational learning and development. 
Nonetheless, scores do give a sense of 
spread and tendency across the state 
services at a particular point in time, 
and provide a sharp focus for the PIF 
system analysis, even if they do not tell 
the whole story. The results of the overall 
system analysis, therefore, should be read 
as indicative and relative rather than 
definitive and absolute. They provide 
some understanding of those things done 
well by agencies, and, at the other end of 
the scale, those areas where performance 
improvement is required. 
The third caution relates to the fact 
that PIF and the system analysis are works 
in progress. The system analysis to date is 
based on the 21 reviews so far completed. 
The picture so far of overall system 
performance may change as new reviews 
are completed. Indeed, if learning across 
the sector is to be continuous, recursive 
and emergent, the overall picture will 
change as the reviews are completed.
The PIF system analysis is proceeding 
with these limitations in mind. The 
commentary and ratings from each of 
the reviews conducted so far have been 
collated and analysed, looking for known 
challenges as a whole and for particular 
sectors, examples of strong performance 
on which to build, and further challenges 
arising across the system. We emphasise 
that system analysis of this type is not 
about identifying poor performers and 
telling them how they could improve. 
Individual reports and agency responses 
are only one set of tools for building 
performance improvement into agency 
strategic planning. Follow-up reviews 
provide a check on progress and advice 
on next steps. System analysis is about 
identifying the areas where improvement 
is required or that provide a base for 
improvement elsewhere, looking for the 
themes that explain the ratings and offer 
a starting point for improvement actions, 
and tracking how the capability and 
performance of the system improve over 
time.
What do the findings suggest?
Early system analysis findings were 
reported in a May 2011 Cabinet paper 
available on the SSC website.7 
A condensed version combined with 
central agency responses, as subsequently 
presented to the Better Public Services 
Advisory Group, is shown in Table 1.
The May 2011 analysis was based on 
a mixture of text and, mostly, ratings. 
In order to focus on what forward-
looking action could be taken across the 
system, that analysis has been updated. 
A condensed version of that update is 
shown in Table 2. It is important, too, 
that this subsequent analysis focuses on 
why a dimension is important. The focus 
is on strong or well-placed practice: thus 
the combined percentage of these ratings 
is detailed. Further, 21 reports are covered, 
whereas the initial May 2011 analysis 
covered only 10 reports. The analysis is 
also informed by the Better Public Services 
Advisory Group Report, and the known 
challenges the advisory group evidenced 
or started to reveal. 
Combining the matters revealed in 
dimensions one and two, one of the most 
obvious findings is that agencies do what 
the government of the day wants, but 
sustained delivery and strategic building 
for the future continues to be rare. 
Table 1: System analysis findings and central agency responses, May 2011 
Finding of the system review Central agency response 
Agencies tending to be reactive, focusing on the short-term and delivering (well) what Ministers ask for 
today, often at the expense of their obligation to ensure advice is robust over time and capability exists to 
sustain performance in the medium term.
A need for greater system ‘stewardship’.
People management needs improvement, ranging from communicating vision to developing appropriate 
cultures and capability and managing poor performance.
Better leadership required to engage and develop staff.
Allocative efficiency is low:  agencies generally cannot track expenditure and impacts in a meaningful 
fashion, compare cost effectiveness of policy options, or connect such information to how they make 
decisions; and compliance behaviour dominates recording and use of financial information.
Need a common culture of continuous improvement.
Silos persist, getting in the way of information flow between agencies, and between government and 
others.  This limits the ability to deliver advice to Ministers that recognises risks, policy impacts and 
cross-government priorities.  Agencies with cross-government interests struggle to prioritise and exert 
influence.
Need outcome-focused governance and accountability, and mechanisms 
to drive cross-agency priorities.
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Contrary to the still-common stereotype 
of senior leaders in the state services 
as being like Sir Humphrey Appleby 
manipulating the minister (in the satirical 
television series Yes Minister), the reality 
is the opposite: agencies do very well at 
implementing the government’s priorities, 
particularly as they relate to defined, fast-
turnaround, short- to medium-term 
tasks. However, there are weaknesses in 
relation to clear multi-year strategies that 
tie achievement of results to underlying 
capability, clearly communicated from 
boardroom or senior management level 
to the coalface; and in the shaping of 
planning, daily activities, and external 
reporting. 
The first and second performance 
dimensions together are key areas for 
stewardship of state services capability and 
performance, led by the central agencies, 
and reinforced by progress on setting and 
tracking performance expectations as well 
as cross-agency results and medium-term 
planning. Agencies that perform best in 
these two dimensions typically have a 
clearly-defined purpose and relatively 
well-defined goals that are motivating, 
unifying and discriminating (that is, in 
defining direction, setting priorities and 
enlisting the support of others). They 
also have an effective engagement with 
ministers, and use that engagement as 
a foundation for better-focused policy 
and delivery within and across agencies. 
Finally, agencies that do best in these 
dimensions have an operating model and 
internal structures to support the results 
Table 2. PIF System Analysis: Key Findings (November 2012)
Six Dimensions of 
Performance
Why this matters Percentage of 
Greens*
Percentage of Greens per PIF Agency Element
1. Results The legitimacy of public institutions rests on their ability to demonstrate 
high levels of integrity and performance.  The public and their political 
representatives need to be confident that public ownership, funding, provision 
and regulation of activity are adding most value for the community while 
minimising its costs.  Making a positive difference should also help attract, 
retain and motivate the right people to work in the public sector.  
62%
Government Priorities 72%
Core Business Effectiveness 62%
Core Business Efficiency 52%
2. Strategy and Role Clarity in role and strategy bridges policy and delivery; it clarifies for everyone 
how an agency delivers value, and what that value it. It makes a complex 
operating environment simple. When done well it unifies the silos and enables 
prioritisation.  
51%
Engagement with the Minister 81%
Structure, Roles and Responsibilities 38%
Purpose, Vision and Strategy 33%
3. Improving Delivery Part of the public sector’s legitimacy rests on the acceptance that regulation 
adds value for the community in excess of the costs that regulations impose as  
does a well-developed ability to review and test the efficiency and effectiveness 
of what an agency does. In addition it is an important stimulant to innovation 
and creates a structured way for an agency to learn from its experiences and 
identify opportunities for continuous improvement.   
38%
Review 52%
Regulatory Impact 38%
Improving Efficiency and Effectiveness 24%
4. Internal Leadership Great public institutions recognise their role as part of a wider system and know 
who they need to enlist in order to better meet the current and future interests 
of those who they must serve well in order to thrive.  Great public institutions 
align the interests of their institution with those of New Zealand and partner 
effectively with others to ensure those interests are well served.
36%
Leadership and Governance 43%
Engagement with Staff 38%
Leadership and Workforce Development 38%
Values, Behaviour and Culture 33%
Management of People  Performance 29%
5. Working with Others Most people join the public service from a strong sense of mission and an often 
passionate desire to make a positive difference to the lives of New Zealanders.  
Many of the nation’s brightest graduates and best thinkers are attracted by 
the idea of public service.  This is a powerful idea and the talent it attracts is 
arguably the most important asset in the public sector.  This reservoir of talent 
and passionate commitment has a huge opportunity value.  It needs to be fully 
utilised and developed.
48%
Collaboration and Partnership with Stakeholders 
57%
Experiences of the Public 52%
Sector Contribution 33%
6. Finance and 
Resources
This dimension is important as these functions should provide the information, 
intelligence and analysis that forms the basis for decision making that 
underpins strong agency performance.  Superior performance requires that the 
right information is available to the right people at the right time, and that this 
information is properly analysed and used.  Financial and risk management 
are critical components and should help management understand and improve 
operational performance as well as informing strategy formulation, prioritisation 
and investment decisions.  Good risk management is also critical in maintaining 
confidence in the agency.
52%
Financial Management 81%
Asset Management 67%
Risk Management 38%
Information Management 24%
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that are well-defined and clear on what 
needs to be done. 
The third dimension must be looked 
at in tandem with the messages emerging 
from assessments of the effectiveness 
and efficiency of core businesses. The 
core business analysis shows a general 
shortfall in the expected ability to track 
how resources are being used, what 
results are being achieved, and what 
improvements might be possible. Even 
the relatively strong area of review, where 
these are often done well, is undermined 
to some degree by a lack of follow-up 
on the conclusions reached. This is an 
area where progress on sector models, 
benchmarking, improving regulatory 
practice and other Better Public Services 
programme work-streams should pay 
significant dividends, but it will take 
time. On the positive side, the best 
agencies in this dimension demonstrate 
that they value learning, innovation and 
continuous improvement, and expect 
and support ongoing improvement and 
adaption through measurement, testing 
and review. 
Internal leadership is one of the 
most challenging areas of the results 
to date. The challenges here are deep, 
enduring and widespread, and are 
further linked to the matters identified 
under the second dimension (strategy 
and role). Particularly important are 
the need to improve strong, cohesive 
and engaging leadership by senior 
managers, and effective management of 
both good and poor staff performance. 
Only a few agencies enjoy strong 
internal leadership which attracts 
talented people and inspires them. 
Others invest in talent. To make any 
improvements, we believe the central 
agencies and senior leaders in the state 
services need to see building strong 
institutions as our core purpose. 
Results through collaboration 
by agencies also indicate an area of 
weakness, and have done so consistently. 
Collaboration is central to effective 
delivery of the ten result areas, let 
alone of cross-cutting results in other 
complex social or economic areas. 
This includes collaboration with non-
government parties, whether third-party 
service providers, stakeholder groups or 
customers. That said, there is an issue 
over the definition of collaboration 
and the real or perceived legal and 
institutional barriers to achieving it. 
With progress in clarifying expectations 
and in steps to reduce the barriers, this 
area can be expected to show significant 
improvement in the next cycle of reviews. 
In the meantime, we note that the best-
performing agencies enlist the active 
support of all those outside the agency 
who are necessary to it delivering its key 
results.
The final dimension – finance and 
resources – has one of the better stories 
of the results so far; but, even so, it is a 
dimension needing great improvement. The 
public sector has made progress in building 
basic good practice in financial and asset 
management which has made New Zealand 
a world leader in public sector financial 
reporting. Yet we suggest we need to look 
beyond that. What is needed is a step up to 
strategic management of the financial and 
information infrastructure, to support and 
enable strategic and operational decision 
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making on what to do and how best to do 
it. With the standards for financial and asset 
management being raised to this higher 
level, agencies will face challenges to even 
maintain current ratings. 
Lesson learned: results and capability are 
connected 
If scores are ascribed to the ratings achieved 
by agencies in their reviews,8 and those 
scores are cross-tabulated across agencies, 
several lessons become apparent.
One is that, as shown in Figure 1, 
results and capability are positively 
connected. There is a general tendency 
in the distribution towards higher 
scores in results being associated with 
organisations that also score higher on 
capability. The implication of this pattern 
is to reinforce calls for greater attention 
to be paid to strategic capability inside 
state sector organisations. If this is done, 
results will in turn improve.
Another interesting finding in the 
data is shown in Figure 2. The numbers 
in Figure 2 are calculated by subtracting 
each agency’s aggregate capability score 
from its aggregate results score. While 
better capability tends to be associated 
with stronger results, some agencies 
produce better results than might be 
expected from their capability rating, 
while a few produce lower results than 
might be expected. Of course, this only 
holds true if one assumes a starting 
hypothesis that both capability and 
results are measured consistently so 
that a meaningful benchmark can be 
observed, whether that be results = 
capability so that 0.00 is the expected 
score, or the score is the actual average 
so far of 0.32. 
What might this mean? While there 
may be a general positive relationship 
between capability and results, other 
factors may influence how well capability 
is translated into results. For example, 
reviewers have often found agencies that 
attract talented people who are committed 
to advancing New Zealand’s interests, 
and, where this commitment aligned with 
government’s priorities and goals, those 
staff produced results despite the agency. 
It is also possible then some result areas 
have not been set at an appropriate level: 
that is, the results are too easy or too hard 
to achieve, or capability may have been 
assessed too high or too low. It could 
also be that the agency is better or worse 
than expected at converting capability 
into results due to agency, sector or other 
specific reasons – for example, at early 
stages in a transformation process.  
Lesson learned: agency size does not matter
Using the unique number pair (result: 
capability), turning it into a ratio and 
plotting it against number of full-time 
staff equivalents at the time of the review, 
Figure 3 shows that the range of agency 
performance is consistently wide across 
results and capability. This invites a 
conclusion that size does not matter: that 
organisations both large and small can be 
capable and effective in achieving results. 
High-quality management of the available 
Figure 3: Agency size (staff numbers) and average rating (capability and results)
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resources within an organisation may be 
more important than the quantum of 
people resources available.
Lesson learned: purpose, vision and strategy 
do matter 
Once again, the PIF system analysis 
confirms an obvious lesson. As shown in 
Figure 4, there is a positive association 
between agency rankings as applied 
by the PIF reviewers and the extent to 
which each organisation also scored 
high in clarity of vision and appropriate 
structures and roles. Overall, these are 
the matters included in the strategy 
and role grouping in Table 2. In other 
words, as the classic models of strategic 
management have suggested for more 
than 30 years, where organisations define 
their vision, goals and objectives and 
create structures and roles that align with 
them, they perform better in achieving 
desired results for government.
Lesson learned: efficiency continues to elude 
us
While the New Zealand public 
management system is better for many of 
the changes flowing from the new focus 
arising from the State-Owned Enterprises 
Act 1986 – followed by the State Sector 
Act 1988, the Public Finance Act 1989 and 
other legislation, concluding with the 
Crown Entities Act in 2004 – an improved 
ability to measure efficiency is not one of 
them. Figure 5 summarises the problem. 
Efficiency suffers from problems in 
outcome and output definitions. Agencies 
generally lack data to make efficiency 
improvements, and do not treat enhancing 
efficiency as a core business driver but more 
as a one-off, externally-driven exercise. The 
strongest performance tends to be in large 
operational agencies, but even here some 
lead reviewers expressed concern about a 
focus on one-off exercises at the possible 
expense of efficiency as business-as-usual, 
and wide variation in practice. 
How does PIF system analysis fit with state 
sector change?
As suggested above, the system 
analysis strongly supports the areas of 
performance identified in the Better 
Public Services programme and the 
actions being taken to address those areas, 
as well as helping to identify where there 
is scope to build on strong performance. 
The ‘four-year excellence horizon’ also 
reinforces the increasing medium-term 
focus across state services planning and 
reporting – from the four-year budget 
plans and workforce strategies, to long-
term regulatory plans and the two-yearly 
regulatory best-practice assessments. It is 
no longer enough, if it ever was, to deliver 
on the current year’s performance targets. 
Rather, it is now about how an agency 
delivers over the next several years, what 
capability that will require, and how an 
agency can ensure it is in place.
An increased emphasis is also being 
placed on benchmarking of performance, 
Critical Areas Element
External Relationships Engagement with Minister(s)
Financial and Resource Management Financial Management
Financial and Resource Management Asset Management
External Relationships Collab and Partnerships with Stakeholders
External Relationships Experiences of the Public
Leadership, Direction and Delivery Review
Leadership, Direction and Delivery Leadership and Governance
People Development Engagement with Staff
Regulatory impact
Leadership, Direction and Delivery Structure, Roles and Responsibilities
Financial and Resource Management Risk Management
People Development Leadership and Workforce Development
Leadership, Direction and Delivery Purpose, Vision and Strategy
Leadership, Direction and Delivery Values, Behaviour and Culture
External Relationships Sector Contributions
People Development  Management of People Performance
Financial and Resource Management Improving Efficiency and Effectiveness
Financial and Resource Management Information Management
Strong Weak Unable to rate/not ratedWell placed Needing Development
Figure 5: Organisational elements – from strongest to those needing improvement*
* ‘Traffic light’ colours were used in the original version
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backed up by clearly-defined performance 
metrics and external scrutiny. These PIF 
results can be combined with a growing 
database of other information, such 
as BASS, policy advice benchmarking, 
asset maturity model assessments, 
audit results, best practice regulation 
assessments, among others. Such whole-
of-system assessments, integrated with 
agency-specific data, should allow a 
detailed ‘dashboard’ analysis of individual 
agency performance and of how it can be 
improved – supporting efforts to address 
policy and delivery challenges – and 
cross-agency identification of common 
challenges and solutions. Thus, the PIF is 
part of a shift to a more explicit standard 
of defining and tracking performance, 
changing the nature of incentives in the 
public sector, boosting the role that the 
corporate centre can play, and enhancing 
the ability for stakeholders and the public 
to scrutinise what they are getting for 
their tax dollars.
Conclusion
There are a number of big cross-
cutting issues that have eluded previous 
governments, addressing them will require 
a sustained public and private effort to 
address. The state sector has a vital role 
to play, but transformational change is 
needed to deliver the integrated, high-
integrity, high-performing state services 
that are obviously required. Both the State 
Services Commission and the Treasury 
have a legislative mandate which gives 
them a central role to play in bringing 
this transformation about. Stepping up 
to this challenge will require significant 
changes in the way all three central 
agencies operate. While they are well 
placed in terms of helping sustain trust 
in the integrity of New Zealand’s public 
institutions, work needs to be done before 
the central agencies can play a vital role in 
leading integrated, high-performing state 
services and extending that to the wider 
state sector. Many of these changes are 
being made. But, to borrow a phrase from 
a previous state services commissioner, 
‘the harder yards’ are still ahead (State 
Services Commissioner, 2003). There 
is much more to be done by both the 
central agencies and senior leaders in the 
wider state services. State servants can 
only expect true trust and confidence 
from New Zealand citizens when both 
integrity and performance are consistently 
demonstrated to the highest level across 
the whole state sector.
1 The central agencies are the Department of Prime Minister 
and Cabinet, the State Services Commission and the 
Treasury. 
2 Reviews of the departments of Conservation and Corrections, 
the Crown Law Office, the ministries of Defence and 
Education, the Education Review Office, the former 
Ministry of Economic Development, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade, Inland Revenue Department, Ministry of 
Justice, Land Information New Zealand, Ministry of Mäori 
Development, New Zealand Customs Service, the ministries 
of Pacific Island Affairs and Social Development, Statistics 
New Zealand, the Treasury and the Ministry of Women’s 
Affairs, as well as the New Zealand Transport Agency and 
New Zealand Trade and Enterprise, and New Zealand Police: 
18 public service departments, two Crown entities and one 
non-public service department. Reports are available at 
www.ssc.govt.nz/pif. 
3 The authors would like to make special mention of Associate 
Professor Bill Ryan, who has provided guidance and 
encouragement in the exposition of this data set, and also 
of Dr Murray Horn and Debbie Francis, who are preparing 
to finalise a report summarising the 21 PIF reports from the 
perspective of lead reviewers. The analysis in this article was 
one input into their report.
4 The ex ante lines of enquiry were developed as part of the 
PIF redesign process in 2011. The PIF review of the Ministry 
of Economic Development was the first to include this 
addition. As well as the addition of the ex ante component, 
the entire PIF process was redesigned between August 
and September 2011. The goal of the redesign was to 
provide greater value at a reduced cost. A rapid-prototyping 
process improvement process was used. It resulted in an 
average 30% cost reduction per review. In addition, the 
lead reviewer cadre was refreshed. The cadre has additional 
experience and skill in public and private partnerships, large 
infrastructure projects and public and private sector change 
management programmes. Finally, governance and funding 
arrangements were clarified.
5 See, for example, the benchmarking report for 2010/11 
published at http://www.treasury.govt.nz/statesector/
performance/bass/benchmarking/2010-11.
6 For a more in-depth understanding of the PIF agency 
model, see the first of three core guides available on the 
PIF website: Core Guide 1: understanding the performance 
framework agency model (August 2012). This provides 
detailed insight into the design of the PIF, including the 28 
lead questions and 88 lines of enquiry. 
7 Cabinet papers and related announcements are available at 
http://www.ssc.govt.nz/pif-reports-announcements.
8 A crude way to examine this relationship is to plot 
the combined score for results and capability for each 
organisation reviewed. In this case, the colour rating scale 
was translated into a numerical scale for each element 
of result or capability. These could then be added and 
an average score for both results and capability can be 
calculated for each organisation. Each organisation can then 
be represented by a unique number pair (result: capability) 
and plotted on a graph. The graph here shows the result for 
all 21 organisations, along with a ‘best fit’ line that illustrates 
what the data suggests is the expected relationship between 
capability and results. 
References
Ryan, B. (2004) Learning MFO: developments in managing for outcomes 
– Queensland case study, Brisbane: Institute of Public Administration 
Australia
Better Public Services Advisory Group (2011) Better Public Services 
Advisory Group Report, Wellington: Department of the Prime Minister 
and Cabinet
State Services Commissioner (2003) ‘Getting better results: progress 
report March 2003’, extract from the March monthly report from to 
the Minister of State Services, 7 April
State Services Commission (2011a) Briefing to Incoming Minister of 
State Services, Wellington: State Services Commission
State Services Commission (2011b) Road Map: Performance 
Improvement Framework, Wellington: State Services Commission, the 
Treasury and the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet
State Services Commission (2012a) Fact Sheet 3: How does PIF fit 
with other business improvement tools?, Wellington: State Services 
Commission, the Treasury and the Department of the Prime Minister 
and Cabinet
State Services Commission (2012b) Fact Sheet 4: what are the 
performance challenge and four-year excellence horizon?, State 
Services Commission, the Treasury and the Department of the Prime 
Minister and Cabinet
State Services Commission (2012c) Fact Sheet 5: what are the system 
level ratings? Wellington: State Services Commission, the Treasury 
and the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet
State Services Commission (2012d) Annual Report for the year ended 
30 June 2012, Wellington: State Services Commission
Provoking Debate and Learning Lessons: it is early days, but what does the Performance Improvement Framework  
challenge us to think about?
FUTURE STATE 
Directions for Public Management in New Zealand
Edited by Bill Ryan & Derek Gill
New Zealand’s public sector has 
consistently rated well internationally 
on a variety of measures of comparative 
government performance. In the 1980s 
New Zealand achieved a step change in 
public sector reform when it introduced 
a distinctive and widely applauded 
model of public management. Despite 
attempts at continuing improvement, 
however, New Zealand has struggled 
over the past decade to keep developing 
the frameworks and tools that public 
managers require to manage efficiently 
and effectively in the public sector. New 
Zealanders are becoming more diverse 
in their needs, ethnicities and lifestyles, 
and more demanding their expectations, 
and the weight of these expectations 
increasingly impacts on government. In 
the face of these changing circumstances, 
it is tempting to stick with the current 
model and continue to refine and adjust 
it. But tweaking is no longer enough – 
another step change is required.
In 2001 the chief executives of several 
public sector organisations commissioned 
a group of researchers associated with 
the School of Government at Victoria 
University of Wellington to undertake a 
project looking at the ‘future state’ – to 
consider present trends that would 
impact on public management in coming 
years. Future State pulls together the 
results of the work, covering emerging 
trends in governance, from both New 
Zealand and international perspectives: 
issues, options and policy implications of 
shared accountability; experimentation 
and learning in policy implementation; 
agency restructuring; skills and 
capability; the authorising environment; 
and e-government. It contains valuable 
insights into how New Zealand’s public 
sector currently operates, and how it 
might operate in the future.
A Victoria University Press Publication 
By Bill Ryan & Derek Gill
Publication Date: December 2011
Format  B5 Paperback, pp 348 
ISBN 978-1-86473-820-2  Price - $50  
(including P&P within New Zealand)
To order go to Victoria University Press website
http://www.victoria.ac.nz/vup/2011titleinformation/future.aspx VICTORIA UNIVERSITY PRESS
The Ocean Governance 
project was funded by the 
Emerging Issues Programme, 
overseen by the Institute of 
Policy Studies at Victoria 
University of Wellington.  
Its primary goal is to provide 
interested members of the 
public and policymakers 
with a general overview and 
a description of the types of 
principles, planning tools 
and policy instruments that 
can be used to strengthen 
and improve marine 
governance in New Zealand. 
Dr Michael Vincent 
McGinnis is an Associate 
Professor in International 
Marine Policy and Science 
at the Monterey Institute of 
International Studies and 
the National Centre for the 
Blue Economy in California, 
USA.  He is also a Senior 
Associate of the Institute of 
Policy Studies in the School 
of Government at Victoria 
University of Wellington.  
Ocean Governance 
The New Zealand Dimension 
A summary report by  
Dr Michael Vincent McGinnis
Publication Date: April 2012
Format: A4 Paperback  pp.64
ISNB-978-1-877347-4    IPS 176
A limited number of copies are available free. To obtain a copy please email 
ips@vuw.ac.nz or telephone (04) 4635307
